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431 A.2d 826 (1981).
Traditionally, principles of corporate law have insulated purchasing corporations which succeed to the ownership of manufacturing assets from responsibility for products liability claims arising from

the selling corporation's defectively manufactured products.'

In re-

cent years, however, case law has emerged which embodies the con-

viction that injured product users deserve special protection when a

2
corporation has purchased the assets of the original manufacturer.

The result has been the development of a novel approach to products
liability claims against successor corporations. 3 In Ramirez v.
Amsted Industries, Inc., 4 and its companion case, Nieves v. Bruno
Sherman Corp. ,5 the Supreme Court of New Jersey acknowledged this
trend of increased protection by fashioning a new remedy for the
injured in products liability actions against successor corporations.
Transcending the traditional adherence to narrow corporate rules
governing successor liability, the court held that "the social policies
underlying strict products liability in New Jersey are best served by
extending strict liability to a successor corporation that acquires the
business assets and continues to manufacture essentially the same line
of products as its predecessor." 6
In 1975, plaintiff, Efrain Ramirez, sustained personal injuries
while using an allegedly defective power press at his place of employ-

' See, e.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Kloberdanz v. Joy
Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968). See also 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE COonRrATIoNs § 7121 (rev. perm. ed. 1973). There are well-established exceptions to
the general rule of successor nonliability. See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
2 E.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal.
3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406,
244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). Product users have been afforded increasing legal protection since early
times when liability required breach of an express warranty or negligence, and when privity of
contract was a common bar to recovery. See Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). See also note 190 infra.
3 Bt~ci's LAW DICIONARY 1600 (5th ed. 1979), defines a successor corporation as "another
corporation which, through amalgamation, consolidation, or other legal succession, becomes
invested with rights and assumes burdens of first corporation.'" See also W. FLETrCHE, svpra note
1, at § 7203.
4 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
5 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981).
6 86 N.J. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825.
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ment. 7 The press was manufactured in 1948 or 1949 by Johnson
Machine and Press Company. 8 Johnson sold all its assets and liabili-

ties in 1956 to Bontrager Construction Company. 9 As part of this
transaction a single share of Johnson common stock was retained by
Bontrager to continue the Johnson trade name and corporate form,
although Johnson no longer conducted business as 'an independent
manufacturing entity. 10 Thereafter, Bontrager manufactured the
Johnson power press line until the defendant, Amsted Industries, Inc.,
purchased Bontrager's entire manufacturing operation in 1962."1 Encompassed in this transaction were all of Bontrager's assets, including
the sole share of Johnson stock. 12 Unlike the Bontrager-Johnson

transaction, however, Amsted expressly disclaimed any liability for
defective products manufactured prior to the 1962 purchase agreement and agreed to assume only those debts and obligations incurred
13
by Bontrager in the normal course of business.

Amsted manufactured Johnson presses through a wholly-owned
subsidiary until 1965 when both the subsidiary and Johnson were
formally dissolved.' 4

Thereafter, a division of Amsted continued

manufacturing the Johnson press line until 1975 when the business
was sold to a newly formed corporation, South Bend Lathe, Inc.' 5
In this purchase agreement Amsted expressly assumed responsibility
for "any liability claims against South Bend Lathe arising out of any
defects in the Johnson product line." '6
The plaintiff brought suit against Amsted as Johnson's successor
corporation, claiming damages caused by the Johnson press on the
7
basis of strict liability in tort, negligence, and breach of warranty.'

Id. at 335, 431 A.2d at 812.
8 Id., 431 A.2d at 813.
9 Id. at 337, 431 A.2d at 814.
10Id. at 337-38, 431 A.2d at 814. In effect, Johnson Machine & Press Co.existed only as a
"'corporate shell" following the acquisition. Id. at 339, 431 A.2d at 815.
1Id. at 338, 431 A.2d at 814. Amsted purchased the entire Bontrager operation, including
such tangible assets as the manufacturing plant, property, inventory, equipment, patents,
trademarks, and various intangible assets, among which were good will, lists of prospective
clients, trade secrets, and the exclusive right to the Johnson trade name. Id.
7

12

Id.

13Id. at 338-39, 431 A.2d at 814.
14 Id. at 339, 431 A.2d at 815.
5 Id. at 339-40, 431 A.2d at 815. The Amsted subsidiary which initially manufactured the
Johnson press line was also known as South Bend Lathe, Inc. Id. at 339, 431 A.2d at 814.
I8
Id. at 340, 431 A.2d at 815.
I7
Id. at 335, 431 A.2d at 813. Although the complaint named various distributors as
codefendants, all claims against them had been settled or dismissed. Id. at 336 n.1, 431 A.2d at
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Following discovery, Amsted moved for summary judgment, contending "that the mere purchase of Johnson's assets for cash in 1962 did not
carry with it tort liability for damages arising out of defects in products manufactured by Johnson."' 8 The trial court agreed with this
argument and granted summary judgment for the defendant.", In so
of liability in the
doing, the trial court found the express limitation
20
purchase agreement particularly significant.
On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court's holding was
antithetical to public policy disfavoring the use of exculpatory clauses
to escape liability.2 ' Finding plaintiff's contention persuasive, the
appellate division reversed and remanded the case for trial. 22 In
reaching this result, the appellate division rejected the long-established rule of corporate law which allowed "the intricacies of the law
of corporate mergers and disclaimers" 23 to frustrate the developing
law of products liability. 24 Instead, the court utilized the evolving
law of products liability representing a trend which premises a successor corporation's liability on the continuation of the product line. 5
The appellate court held that a successor corporation which purchases
the assets of its predecessor and continues manufacturing the same
product line can incur liability for personal injury claims arising from
26
the pre-sale activities of the predecessor.
The defendant then appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court
which granted its petition for certification.2 7 In affirming, the supreme court substantially adopted the reasoning of the appellate division which departed from traditional corporate law analysis.

28

Jus-

tice Clifford, writing for the majority, stated that the principles
813 n. 1. It is not clear whether South Bend Lathe, Inc. was also named. Amsted acknowledged,
however, that it must indemnify South Bend Lathe, Inc. and was therefore responsible for all
claims against it arising from defective Johnson presses. Id. at 340, 431 A.2d at 815.
IS Id. at 336, 431 A.2d at 813. Amsted based its argument on the traditional common law
rule which governed successor liability. See notes 30-32 infra and accompanying text.
'9 86 N.J. at 336, 431 A.2d at 813.
20

Id.

21 Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 261, 264, 408 A.2d 818, 820 (App. Div.
1979), afJ'd, 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981). See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 373, 161 A.2d 69, 78 (1960) (anticipatory exculpation invalid when employed to defeat
legitimate claims).
22 86 N.J. at 337, 431 A.2d at 813.
23 Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 261, 275, 408 A.2d 818, 826 (App. Div.
1979), aff'd, 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
24

Id.

2- Id. at 270-74, 408 A.2d at 823-25.
26 Id. at 278, 408 A.2d at 827.
27 Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 82 N.J. 298, 412 A.2d 804 (1980).
2.86 N.J. at 335, 431 A.2d at 812.
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underlying the developing area of products liability law would be
advanced by formulating a new test to resolve the issue of successor
corporation liability.2 9 McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co.,30 recognized
by the court as heretofore the leading New Jersey case on successor
corporation liability, 3' outlined the corporate principles that govern
an assumption of liability. Under these well-established principles, the
corporation purchasing assets for cash does not assume liability unless
one of five exceptions exist: 1) the purchaser expressly or implicitly
agrees to assume the seller's liabilities; 2) the acquisition is effected
through a merger or consolidation; 3) the purchaser is a continuation
of the selling corporation; 4) the transaction is fraudulently undertaken in order to avert liability; or 5) there is an absence of adequate
consideration. 32 It was upon these accepted precepts that defendant
fashioned its acquisition, and upon which it urged the court to con33
sider its potential liability.
Realizing that rigid adherence to the narrow application of the
exceptions outlined in *McKeewould leave the plaintiff without legal
recourse, Justice Clifford rejected defendant's contention that the corporate principle of nonliability was controlling. 34 Furthermore, the
court criticized the traditional rule as being wholly anachronistic to
the principles of products liability law and unresponsive to the legitimate interests of the injured plaintiff. 35 Consequently, the court's
analysis deviated from a traditional corporate perspective and reviewed alternative approaches utilized by other courts in an effort to
3
develop a more responsive rule of law. 0
The court relied on a leading federal decision, Cyr v. B. Offen &
Co.,37 which expanded the criteria establishing the continuation exception to nonliability to find a successor corporation responsible for
the products liability claims arising from defective products of its
9 Id. at 349-50, 431 A.2d at 820-21.

109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Law Div. 1970), affd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480.
288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972).
11 86 N.J. at 331, 431 A.2d at 815.
'2 109 N.J. Super. at 561, 264 A.2d at 101-02. The court noted that the fifth exception is
sometimes categorized as an element of one of the other exceptions. Id. See Ozan Lumber Co. v.
Davis Sewing Mach. Co., 284 F. 161 (D. Del. 1922); Schwartz v. McGraw Edison Co., 14 Cal.
App. 3d 767, 92 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1971); Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co.. 138
La. 743, 70 So. 789 (1916). See also Annot., 66 A.L.R. 3d 824, 850-53 (1975); 19 AM. Jun. 2d
Corporations§ 1551 (1965).
3386 N.J. at 340, 431 A.2d at 815.
1 Id. at 342-43, 431 A.2d at 816.
's Id. See notes 114-24 infra and accompanying text.
11 Justice Clifford noted that the issue of successor corporation liability was one of first
impression for the New Jersey Supreme Court. 86 N.J. at 340, 431 A.2d at 815.
3' 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
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predecessor. 3 The Cyr court justified imposing liability on the successor corporation on the basis of public policy considerations underlying products liability law. 3 9 Under traditional corporate law the
defendant would have evaded the liability of its predecessor since it
purchased the assets for cash, disclaimed any responsibility for contingent liabilities, and shared no common identity of ownership with its
predecessor. 40 The court determined, however, that the policy considerations which justified imposing liability on the original manufacturer also justified imposing liability on the successor corporation
which represented itself as a continuation of the predecessor. 4' Such
considerations included the manufacturer's superior ability to calculate and insure against the risk of injury, and to reflect those costs in
adjusted contract negotiations and increased product prices.4 The
Cyr court also maintained that having received the benefits associated
with the predecessor's assets, the successor should not be allowed to
escape the burdens associated with the continuation of the product
43
line.
Justice Clifford continued his analysis by examining alternative
approaches to successor corporation liability which built on the policy
rationale espoused in Cyr. In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 44 a
majority of the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the traditional corporate criteria for determining successor corporation products liability
as inapposite to the policies underlying strict liability. 45 Turner emphasized that imposing liability should not turn on whether the acquisition was effected through a transfer of stock or a purchase for
cash. 46

The Turner test, which demonstrated a basic continuity of

'

Prior to Cyr, the prima facie elements necessary to invoke the continuation exception were
a stock-for-asset acquisition and the ensuing dissolution of the seller. Together, these requirements established a continuity of ownership. See. e.g., Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F.
Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968), McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98
(Law Div. 1970), affd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972). By
imposing liability on the successor who was a stranger to the seller, the Cyr court twisted the
continuation exception to encompass a continuity of business operations without any commonality in ownership. See generally Note, Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.: Liability of Business TransereegJor
Product Injuries, 27 ME. L. REv. 305 (1975).
31 501 F.2d at 1153-54.
40 Id. at 1154.
41 Id.
42 Id.

41 Id. The court reasoned that the successor corporation which has reaped the benefits of
good will associated with a respected trade name and established clients should bear the costs of
injury arising from defective units of the same product line it continues to manufacture. Id.
,4 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
11 Id. at 417-18, 244 N.W.2d at 877-78.
48 Id. at 423, 244 N.W.2d at 880. The court reasoned that [i]t would make better sense if
the law had a common result and allowed products liability recovery in each case.'" Id.

332

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:327

47
the predecessor's enterprise rather than commonality of ownership,

was recognized by the Ramirez majority as "broadening the inroads

into the traditional principles of corporate successor nonliability." 48
Although the court placed considerable weight on the Cyr and
Turner courts' utilization of policy considerations, it refused to focus
its holding on the traditional corporate exceptions to successor nonliability. 49 The court determined that any attempt to structure ex-

pansive guidelines to conform with a corporate framework would
produce inconsistent results.50

Consequently, the court followed the

appellate division's product line analysis which substantially relied on
the California Supreme Court's holding in Ray v. Alad Corp.51 Justice
Clifford found that the rationale employed by the California court,
which completely abandoned traditional corporate principles, was a
more responsive approach. 52 Ray concerned a cash-for-asset acquisition which traditionally would have insulated the defendant from

4" The Turner test contains the following guidelines: 1) continuity of management, personnel, plant, assets; 2) liquidation and dissolution of the seller corporation; and 3) continuity of the
general business operations. Id. at 430, 244 N.W.2d at 883-84. Turner"therefore, eliminated the
transfer of stock as a prima facie determination of the continuation exception to successor
nonliability.
48 86 N.J. at 347, 431 A.2d at 819.
49 Id., 431 A.2d at 818-19. The court conceded that the corporate succession present in
Ramirez satisfied the Turner test of successor liability but based its holding on other grounds.
Id., 431 A.2d at 819. The court pointed to Korzetz v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 136
(E.D. Mich. 1979), a case involving the identical acquisition, as an example of a decision based
on the Turner rationale. 86 N.J. at 345-46, 431 A.2d at 813. Kometz, determined that the
purchase of all the Bontrager assets together with the continuance of the Johnson product line
and general business operations constituted a -'continuation" as envisioned by the Turner rationale, thereby justifying the imposition of liability upon Amsted. 472 F. Supp. at 144. The Kometz
court found the intermediate ownership by Bontrager and its continued corporate existence
following Amsted's purchase, the disclaimer by Amsted of all pre-sale liabilities, and the fact
that Amsted did not use the official Johnson corporate name (Amsted only represented its
products as Johnson presses) irrelevant in its determination of continuity of enterprise. Id.
Contra, Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975), expressly
disapproved in Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977);
Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 70 I11.App. 3d 664, 388 N.E.2d 778 (1975).
50 86 N.J. at 347-48 n.3, 431 A.2d at 819 n.3. The court illustrated this consequence by
comparing two cases involving the same corporate history. In Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp.,
70 I11. App. 3d 644, 388 N.E.2d 778 (1979), an Illinois court of appeals, applying the Turner
rationale, found no de facto merger between Johnson and Amsted. In Korztez v. Amsted Indus..
Inc., 472 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mich. 1979), however, the court, applying the same analysis,
found a continuity of enterprise. Compare Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D.
Colo. 1968) and McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Law Div.
1970), afd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972) with Cyr v. B.
Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
5, 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
S2 86 N.J. at 347-48, 431 A.2d at 819.
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unassumed liabilities. 53 The Ray court observed that a successor was
"an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise

that should bear the costs of injuries resulting from defective products."

54

Satisfied that Ray's product line approach adequately represented New Jersey's public policy considerations, Justice Clifford posited that Ray's three-prong test justified the imposition of liability on
the successor corporation.5 5 The principle elements of this rule are:
(1) the unavailability of an adequate remedy against the original
manufacturer; (2) the successor's capacity to employ cost-avoidance
and risk-spreading devices; and (3) the fundamental fairness in burdening the successor which benefits from the predecessor's trade name
and good will with responsibility for injuries caused by the predecessor's defective products.5 6 These considerations would impose succeswhich continued manufacturing the
sor liability on the corporation
57
predecessor's product line.
Applying the first principle of this tripartite test, the court determined that the instant plaintiff could not recover from the original
manufacturer since it was no longer in existence. 58 Imputing the
predecessor's strict products liability to the successor corporation was
in accordance with New Jersey's long standing policies. 59 These policies seek to place the burden of injury on the manufacturing enterprise, rather than on the innocent victim, since the manufacturer has
the superior ability to measure and insure against the risks of injury.6 0 The court viewed the manufacturer's potential liability as one
s3 In Ray, the successor corporation acquired substantially all of its predecessor's assets for
cash and did not agree to assume any debts or liabilities. In addition, the predecessor agreed to
dissolve as soon as practicable. Therefore, none of the traditionally established exceptions to the
corporate rule of nonliability were found present in the transaction. 19 Cal. 3d at 28-29, 560
P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
51 Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582 (quoting Vandermark v.Ford Motor Co.,
61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-63, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964)).
" 86 N.J. at 349-50, 431 A.2d at 820.
19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
57 Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
-1 86 N.J. at 350, 431 A.2d at 820. Bontrager's acquisition of all the Johnson assets resulted in
the destruction of any remedy against Johnson. Amsted's responsibility for the plaintiff's injuries,
however, was not diminished by the existence of Bontrager's intermediate transaction. Since
Amsted's purchase in 1962 resulted in the dissolution of Bontrager and defeated any potential
remedy against it, Amsted was the only viable entity from which the plaintiff could seek
compensation. The court reasoned that the uninterrupted continuation of the Johnson press line
was the most important aspect of the first element in the product line test. Id.
59 Id. at 350-51, 431 A.2d at 820-21.
Id. at 350-52, 431 A.2d at 820-22 (citing Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81
N.J. 150, 400 A.2d 140 (1979) and Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d
305 (1965)). Amsted contended that because it had no connection with the product at the time it
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of an "enterprise liability" 6' which continues throughout the period
the defective product remains on the market. 62 In the opinion of the
court, this enterprise theory of liability could justifiably be applied to
the successor which inherits the same resources and expertise that
enabled the original manufacturer to bear the cost of injuries resulting
from defective products.63 Finally, the court observed that there was
inherent justification in holding Amsted responsible for the tortious
claims against its predecessor since it exploited the benefits associated
with the Johnson trade name and good will, and64 thereby became an
"integral part" of the manufacturing enterprise.
Concluding his analysis, Justice Clifford addressed several legitimate contentions made by the defendant. Amsted asserted that the
product line approach to successor liability would have a crippling
effect on commercial activity. 65 The court reasoned, however, that
as business planners become aware of the new rule, they will be able
to employ protective devices and make price adjustments which will
eventually become reflected in the cost of doing business. 6 Secondly,

was placed on the market, it should not be liable for injuries caused by the product. The court
dismissed this contention as "beg~ging] the underlying question involved in downstream corporate liability." Id. at 351, 431 A.2d at 821. Consequently, the court concluded that if the original
manufacturer is no longer a viable source of recovery, the plaintiff should be entitled to recover
from a successor who continued to produce the product line that caused the injury. Id.
61 A manufacturing enterprise will be strictly liable for injuries proximately caused by its
defective products when used in a reasonably foreseeable manner. E.g., Suter v. San Angelo
Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 168-69, 406 A.2d 140, 149 (1979).
62 86 N.J. at 351, 431 A.2d at 821-22.
63 Id. at 352, 431 A.2d at 821-22. In addition, the court reasoned that the successor corporation may spread the costs of protective devices such as insurance and escrow accounts to the
consumer through a higher priced product, or it may adjust the terms of the acquisition to
accurately reflect the worth of the assets. Id. at 353-54, 431 A.2d at 822-23.
4 Id. at 352-53, 431 A.2d at 822.
65 Defendant argued that the small manufacturers would be most adversely affected. Presented with the possibility of unassumed liabilities ascribing to an acquisition, corporations will
be reluctant to purchase assets from a manufacturer that cannot afford to indemnify against
products liability claims, thereby forcing the manufacturing assets to be sold piecemeal (foregoing goodwill) at a lower price. Also, the small manufacturer wishing to purchase assets, yet
unable to afford insurance, will be faced with the dilemma of abandoning the acquisition or
assuming the risk of potential bankruptcy from successful claims. Id. See notes 133-39 infra and
accompanying text.
86 N.J. at 354-55, 431 A.2d at 823. See Turner, 397 Mich. at 428, 244 N.W.2d at 883. The
court recognized that devices such as insurance, indemnification agreements, and escrow accounts may not be readily available to the small manufacturer. 86 N.J. at 354, 431 A.2d at 823.
In fact, investigation undertaken by a legislative subcommittee revealed that in 1977, -'21.6% of
those businesses seeking products liability insurance could not obtain it." Id. at 360, 431 A.2d at
826 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (citing ProductsLiability Insurance HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Capital, Investment and Business Opportunities of the House Committee on Small
Business, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977) (Part I)). The court, acknowledging the validity of such
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the defendant contended that it would be unfair to expose successors
to potential liability for defective products manufactured twentyeight years before the injury. 7 The court responded that under New68
Jersey law, a cause of action does not accrue until the time of injury,
and noted that only the legislature is capable of placing a time limitation on liability. 9 Finally, the defendant argued that it was entitled
to prospective application of the new standard of liability since it
relied on then existing case law 70 in planning and drafting the acquisi-

tion agreement. 7' The court acknowledged the reasonableness of this
reliance, but nonetheless held that there was "basic justness in recognizing that persons who have exercised the initiative to challenge the
existing law should be accorded relief if their claims are ultimately
vindicated."' 72 Therefore, the court retroactively applied the product
line rule to all suits in progress as of November 15, 1979, the date of
73
the appellate division decision.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Schreiber agreed with the majority's substantive holding but maintained that a retroactive application
should have focused on the date of acquisition.7 4 The concurring
concerns, nevertheless stated that the policy considerations underlying products liability law
dictated protection of the defenseless part), from defective products. 86 N.J. at 354, 431 A.2d at
823.
' 86 N.J. at 355. 431 A.2d at 823.
Id. Accrual of the cause of action begins at the time of injury, not upon the creation of the
danger or condition which brought about the injury. See, e.g., Rosenau v. New Brunswick &
Gamon Meter Co., 51 N.J. 130, 137, 238 A.2d 169, 172 (1963).
6"86 N.J. at 355-56, 431 A.2d at 823-24. As indicative of a valid legislative time constraint
on liability, the court noted the appellate division's analogy to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.1
(West Cum. Supp. 1981), which requires that actions arising from defective improvement to real
property be brought within ten years of the time the improvement was made. Id. See Rosenberg
v. North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190. 198-201, 293 A.2d 662, 665-68 (1972) (constitutionality of statute
upheld despite claims that it may bar cause of action before it arises), Brown v. Jersey Cent.
Power & Light Co., 163 N.J. Super. 179, 192-94, 394 A.2d 397, 404-05 (App. Div. 1978), certif.
denied, 79 N.J. 489, 401 A.2d 244 (1979). The appellate division also noted that seventeen other
states have established some form of time limitation relating to products liability actions.
Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 261, 277 n.2, 408 A.2d 818, 827 n.2 (App. Div.
1979). ajf'd, 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981). See Note, Limitationsof Actions: Strict Liability
in Tort-The Legislature Has Intercened, 67 ILL. B.J. 214 (1978).
See McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555. 264 A.2d 98 (Law Div. 1970),
afJ'd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972).
71 86 N.J. at 356-57, 431 A.2d at 824. See Darrow v. Hanover Twp., 58 N.J. 410, 278 A.2d
200 (1971).
72 86 N.J. at 357, 431 A.2d at 824.
71 Id., 431 A.2d at 824.
71 Id. at 361, 431 A.2d at 826 (Schreiber, J., concurring). In this application, only those
acquisitions that were entered into as of November 15, 1979, would be affected by the product
line standard. Supporting this application as an equitable solution. Justice Schreiber noted that
the products liability claimant may have alternative, non-judicial sources of recovery such as
worker's compensation or personal insurance coverage, and potential sources of compensation
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justice further advocated a need to respect the contractual agreements

between previous successors and predecessors that have bargained for
specific indemnification agreements and have procured the concommitant insurance coverage. 75 He also criticized the majority for failing to provide guidance for the equitable resolution of the difficulties
businesses will face in attempting to insure the products of their

predecessors, and consequently, predicted disasterous economic consequences. 7 °
The product line standard adopted in Ramirez was applied to a
similar corporate succession in a companion case, Nieves v. Bruno
Sherman Corp. 77 In Nieves, the supreme court extended its application of the product line standard to an intermediate successor corporation which discontinued manufacturing the product line.7 8 On July
26, 1976, plaintiff, Luis Nieves, was injured while operating an allegedly defective power press manufactured by T.W. & C.B. Sheridan

Company in 1941 . 7

In 1964 Sheridan sold its assets to Harris-Inter-

type Corporation along with certain of its liabilities. 80 Shortly thereafter Sheridan dissolved.8 1 Harris continued manufacturing the
Sheridan line of presses for eight years. 82 In 1972 the Bruno Sherman

against the original manufacturer or its insurer. Id. This final observation assumes that a
successor will be held liable even though the original manufacturer is an ongoing entity. Such a
conclusion, however, is not readily gleaned from the majority's analysis, although it would seem
to be a logical progression of the product line approach to successor liability. See note 149 infra
and accompanying text.
75 86 N.J. at 359-60, 431 A.2d at 825-26 (Schreiber, J., concurring). Often the price of the
purchased assets is influenced by the degree to which the purchaser must assume debts and
liabilities as part of the bargain. See J. McGAFFEY, BUYING, SELLING, AND M~ici c BUSINESSES
1-2 (1979); Kadens, Practitioner'sGuide to Treatment of Seller's Products Liabilities in Assets
Acquisitions, 16 U. TOL. L. REv. 1, 32-44 (1978).
The concurring justice contended that a retrospective application results in a windfall for
the seller at the expense of the buyer. The seller receives a higher price than it would have
otherwise received for its supposedly liability-free assets, while at the same time avoiding
potential products liability. 86 N.J. at 360, 431 A.2d at 826 (Schreiber, J., concurring). See Ray,
19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
76 86 N.J. at 360, 431 A.2d at 826 (Schreiber, J., concurring). See notes 133-39 injra and
accompanying text.
77 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981).
18 Id. at 364, 431 A.2d at 827.
79 Id. at 365, 431 A.2d at 828. The power press was purchased second hand in 1966 by
plaintiffs employer. Plaintiff contended, however, that the press was defective when originally
sold. Id.
" Id.
si Id. at 366, 431 A.2d at 828-29. Dissolution occurred upon the distribution of cash proceeds
to Sheridan's shareholders. Id.
82 Id., 431 A.2d at 829. Harris initially manufactured the Sheridan presses through a
subsidiary also named T.W. & C.B. Sheridan Co., which was managed by the corporate officers
of the original manufacturer. In 1968 that subsidiary merged with Harris-Intertype and manufacturing operations were conducted through a division of Harris. Id.
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Corporation purchased all the Sheridan assets from Harris and continued manufacturing the Sheridan presses out of its own plant.8 3 In
this purchase agreement Bruno Sherman expressly disclaimed any
liability for the products liability claims against Harris." 4 Harris
continued operating but manufactured a different product. 85 Pleading, inter alia, strict liability in tort, plaintiff brought suit against
8
both Harris and Bruno Sherman as Sheridan's corporate successors.
Defendants, in separate motions for summary judgment, contended
that they were not successor corporations to the original manufac87
turer, and, therefore, were not responsible for its defective products.
The trial court relied on the then recently decided appellate
division opinion in Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc.,88 and denied
Harris' motion. 89 In a separate hearing, Bruno Sherman's motion
was granted as a result of the trial court's interpretation of existing
case law which adhered to the traditional corporate rule of successor
corporation nonliability.9 0 Both Harris and the plaintiff appealed to
the appellate division. 9 ' Before the appeals were heard, however, the
New Jersey Supreme Court ordered direct certification to consider the
92
case with Ramirez.

In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the trial court's determination with regard to Bruno Sherman
and held it to be a successor to the Sheridan product line. 93 Applying
the product line guidelines adopted in Ramirez, the court observed
that Bruno Sherman acquired all the Sheridan assets, continued manufacturing the identical product line, and represented its presses to be
Sheridan presses.94 Moreover, because Bruno Sherman exploited the
Sheridan good will and trade name in its continuation of the Sheridan
press line, fairness required that it endure the burden of potential
" Id. Bruno Sherman purchased the entire press manufacturing operation, including good
will, historical data and records, patents, trademarks, technical assistance, personnel training,
and exclusive use of the Sheridan trade name. Id. at 366, 368, 431 A.2d at 829-30.
' Id. at 371, 431 A.2d at 832.
61 Id. at 366. 431 A.2d at 829. Harris agreed not to compete with Bruno Sherman in the
production of power presses for a period of ten years. Id. at 368, 431 A.2d at 830.
* Id. at 366, 431 A.2d at 829.

7

Id.

" 171 N.J. Super. 261, 408 A.2d 818 (App. Div. 1979), affd, 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811
(1981).
86 N.J. at 367, 431 A.2d at 829.
Id. Applying the traditional corporate law approach espoused in McKee, see notes 30-32
supra and accompanying text, the trial court found no evidence of any of the established
exceptions to nonliability in the Bruno-Harris acquisition. 86 N.J. at 367, 431 A.2d at 829.
91 id.
2 Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 84 N.J. 415, 420 A.2d 330 (1980).
03 86 N.J. at 370, 431 A.2d at 831.
9 Id. at 368, 431 A.2d at 830.
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products liability.95 The court further supported its opinion by noting that Bruno Sherman inherited the same resources and expertise
employed by the original manufacturer.98 Therefore, Bruno Sherman not only assumed Sheridan's role as a risk-spreader and costability to bear the costs
avoider, but also acquired Sheridan's 9superior
7
products.
defective
its
from
of injury
In exposing Harris to potential liability, the court extended the
rationale espoused in Ramirez to include intermediate successor corporations. 98 Even though Harris no longer reaped the benefits of
manufacturing the Sheridan presses, the court reasoned that since it
had contributed to the overall manufacturing and marketing operation, it could not circumvent potential liability by its timely disposal
of Sheridan assets.9 9 In accord with the lower court, 0 0 Justice Clifford refused to limit the scope of the product line standard to the
current, viable manufacturer.' 0 ' Since both Harris and Bruno Sherman "st[ood] in the shoes of the original manufacturer," 0 2 they were
successor corporations properly exposed to products liability claims
against the original manufacturer. 0 3 As an alternative theory of

95 Id. at 368-69, 431 A.2d at 830.
96 Id. at 369, 431 A.2d at 830.
97

Id.

18 Id. at 364, 431 A.2d at 827-28.
1 Id. at 371, 431 A.2d at 831. See Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at
582.
100 Although the trial court stated that its holding was based on the appellate division product
line standard adopted in Rarnirez. it relied on Trimper v. Harris Corp., 441 F. Supp. 346 (E.D.
Mich. 1977); Trimper v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 436 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Mich. 1977): and
Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976), which ruled on the
identical transaction. Id. at 361, 431 A.2d at 829. In imposing liability, each of these cases
applied traditional corporate principles to find a "continuity of enterprise." See notes 37-47
supra and accompanying text.
10186 N.J. at 370-72, 431 A.2d at 831-32. Harris argued that the availability of a viable
successor as a source of compensation should preclude exposing the intermediate corporation to
successor liability. Id. at 370, 431 A.2d at 831. Justice Clifford found this argument to be a
distortion of the underlying principles of successor corporation products liability. He interpreted
Ray as being
concerned not as much with the availability of one particular viable successor as it
was with the unavailability of the original manufacturer by reason of its divestiture
of assets and dissolution. The reason the Ray court focused upon only one corporate
successor to the [predecessor's] product line is because there was only one viable,
extant successor corporation.
Id. at 370-71, 431 A.2d at 831 (emphasis in original).
102 Id. at 372, 431 A.2d at 831-32. An indemnification clause found in the Harris-Bruno
Sherman purchase agreement was found to exhibit evidence of Harris's ability to assume the
original manufacturer's role in insuring against potential liability. Id. If applicable to the present
claim, this indemnification clause will control the allocation of liability between the two
successors. Id., 431 A.2d at 832.
103 Id.
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recovery, the plaintiff alleged that Harris and Bruno Sherman
breached their duty to warn the owners of Sheridan presses of latent
defects and to notify them of newly developed safety improvements. 0 4 The court refused to decide this issue, however, because of
the existence of unresolved questions of material fact.10
The Ramirez and Nieves holdings are predicated on the doctrine
of strict liability in tort. A basic objective of strict liability is to place
the loss of injury arising from defective products on the manufacturing enterprise which created the risk of injury and which benefited
from placing those products in the stream of commerce. 0 6 The relationship between the manufacturer and the injured victim is evaluated in "an attempt to minimize the costs of accidents and to consider
who should bear those costs. "10 7 Implicit in this concept is both the
need to protect the injured victim and the recognition of the manufacturer's concomitant responsibility stemming from its placement of the
product in the channels of trade. 08 "The obligation of the manufacturer thus becomes what in justice it ought to be-an enterprise
liability .... ."109 The very essence of enterprise liability suggests

that the manufacturer is better equipped than the victim to sustain the

costs of injury.1 0 Logically, the successor corporation is also better
able to absorb the costs of injury since it carries on the same manufacturing enterprise along with the knowledge and expertise attached
thereto."' Accordingly, in formulating a product line standard,
Ramirez and its companion case have extended the manufacturer's
strict products liability to its corporate successors." 2 Because estabId. See notes 177-82 inJra and accompanying text.
86 N.J. at 373, 431 A.2d at 833. Accordingly, the duty to warn issue was remanded to the
trial court for determination. Id.
t, Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 65, 207 A.2d 305, 311-12 (1972).
Suter %.San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 173, 406 A.2d 140, 151 (1979)
(citing Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts., 81 YALE L.J. 1055
(1972)).
"" E.g.. Santor v. Karagheusian. Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1972); Henningsen ",
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See RESrATE.MENT (SECOND) OF Torrs
402A, Comment c, at 349 (1965).
Santor v. A. & \I. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 65, 207 A.2d 305, 311-12 (1972).
See Cyr. 501 F.2d at 1154; Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150,
173-74, 406 A.2d 140, 151 (1979).
"I See Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 33, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581. But cf. Woody v.
Combustion Eng'r, Inc.. 463 F. Supp. 817, 820 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (successor in no better
position than entire industry which bears as close a relationship to predecessor as successor);
Johnson v. Marshall & Huschart Mach. Co., 66 III. App. 3d 766, 770-71, 384 N.E.2d 141,
144.45 (1978) (not apparent that successor inherits same resources for risk-spreading where 36
)ears separated sale of product and injury).
" In extending the predecessor's enterprise liability to the successor corporation, strict product liability now adheres to the nature of the manufacturing enterprise and not to the corporate
entity.
',
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lished corporate rules insulated a successor corporation from its predecessor's products liability, the supreme court circumscribed the tradi-

3
tional approach and instead relied on principles of strict liability."1
Under traditional corporate rules, corporations could formulate

their transactions to limit the scope of their potential liability, provided that the transactions were in good faith and for adequate consideration.11 4 The exceptions to the general rule of nonliability were
developed for the protection of creditor and shareholder interests."15
In determining successor liability in the corporate context, courts
examine acquisitions to ascertain whether existing debts and obligations have been discharged, and to insure that shareholders have
received fair value for their interests." 6 Consequently, the terms of
the acquisition would normally provide for the discharge of obligations and contemplate an adequate distribution of proceeds upon the
dissolution of the seller. 117 The victim whose claim is unascertainable
at the time of the acquisition, however, is left unprotected by the
terms of the purchase agreement."" As a practical matter, corporations do not provide for unknown, contingent products liability
claims' 19 unless expressly bargained for in the purchase agreement.

Therefore, within the context of products liability claims, the deter20
minative corporate considerations are not dispositive.

"3

86 N.J. at 341, 431 A.2d at 815. See, e.g.. Turner. 397 Mich. at 418. 244 N.W.2d at 878.

"4 See McKee, 109 N.J. Super. at 571, 264 A.2d at 107 (citing West Tex. Ref. & D. Co. v.
Commissioner, 68 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1933)). This judicially designed rule was developed in
recognition of the business planner's interest in acquisitions free of liability and the need for
settled rules to facilitate purchases. See Kadens, supra note 75, at 4 & n.51.
'1 Turner, 397 Mich. at 417-18, 244 N.W.2d at 877-78. See Applestein v. United Board &
Carton Co., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 159 A.2d 146 (Ch. Div.), a~ffd percuriamn, 33 N.J. 72. 161 A.2d
474 (App. Div. 1960). Cf. Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1152 (exceptions were developed to determine
liability in tax assessments).
16 SeeWilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140 N.J. Super. 476, 485, 356 A.2d 458, 463-64 (Law Div.
1976).
"7 New Jersey's dissolution statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-1 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
provides, inter alia, such protection for the claims of creditors and shareholders.
118 See, e.g., Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1965); McKee v.
Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Law Div. 1970), afJfd per curias, 118
N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972). For a general discussion of the obstacles a
products liability claimant faces even when he is injured prior to the acquisition, see Juenger &
Schulman, Asset Sales and Products Liability, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 39, 41-44 (1975).
119See Note, Expanding the Products Liability of Successor Corporations.27 HASTINGs L.J.
1305, 1311 (1976).
120 FehI v. S.W.C. Corp., 433 F. Supp. 939, 946 n.10 (D. Del. 1977). See Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at
31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580. Ray examined the practical effect of resolving a
products liability claim with corporate principles. In that action, the transaction did not fall
within any of the traditional exceptions to successor nonliability because all known debts were
discharged, shareholders had received their value of the remaining assets, the transaction was at
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Those decisions expanding the traditional corporate rule of nonliability to encompass product injury claims' 2 1 are, ultimately, just as

inadequate. 2 2 Distorting existing law only leads to sporadic and
inconsistent recovery. 2 3 In this respect, the expansive approach to
successor corporation liability contributes little to the judicial efforts
to create a remedy that will produce common results in products
liability claims. 24 Furthermore, those corporate policies which the
traditional rule was designed to protect are equally frustrated. 2 5 By
resolving this issue with principles of tort law instead, the interests of
creditors, shareholders, and corporate planners are preserved. Courts,
no longer faced with a need to stretch the corporate rules to offer
protection to a larger class of claimants, will be able to settle corporate issues with more consistency. 26 At the same time, courts will
accomplish a critical goal of products liability law by creating a rule
that provides relief to claimants in successor corporation liability
27
actions regardless of the structure of the acquisition.

Recovery by an injured victim within the context of a successor's
liability can only be consistently awarded by imposing liability based

on the three policy rationales delineated in Ray. 28 First, the plaintiff
arms-length, and the transaction did not include an agreement to assume liability. Id. Yet,
because plaintiff was injured shortly after the transaction, its claim was unascertained at the
time of acquisition and was therefore not provided for in the purchase agreement. The court
noted that any possibility of recovery for the plaintiff would have been defeated by insurmountable obstacles. Id.
121 See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974): Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co.,
397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W. 2d 894 (1976). See notes 37-48 supra and accompanying text.
12 See Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 30, 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579; Ramirez, 86 N.J. at
347-48, 431 A.2d at 819.
'"
See Turner, 397 Mich. at 453, 244 N.W.2d at 894 (Coleman, J., dissenting); Comment,
Extension of Strict Tort Liability to Successor Corporations,61 MARQ. L. REav. 595, 599 (1978).
Compare Trimper v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 436 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Mich. 1977) with Travis v.
Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977).
124 For a general discussion of the advantages of deciding the issue from a strict tort approach
rather than from an expansive approach within a corporate framework, see Comment, Products
Liability-Liability of Transferee for Defective Products Manufactured by Transferor, 30
VAND. L. REv. 238, 252-57 (1977).
I" See Note, Assumption of Products Liability in CorporateAcquisitions, 55 B.U. L. REV. 86,
95 (1975).
16 See Note, Products Liability for Successor Corporations:A Break from Tradition, 49 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 357, 368-69 (1978). Furthermore, by maintaining separate rules of law for the
personal injury claim and the commercial claim, creditors would be deterred from attempting to
apply the more liberal tort theories of recovery. Cf. State v. Perkins & Will Architects, Inc., 90
111.App. 3d 349, 413 N.E.2d 29 (1980) (in dictum, product line rule of successor corporation
liability for personal injury determined inapplicable in creditor's claim against predecessor). See
Note, supra note 119, at 1331.
117A fundamental purpose of products liability is to circumvent those principles of law that
frustrate the plaintiff's recovery for legitimate claims. See note 190 infra.
'* 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
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who is no longer able to obtain compensation from the original manufacturer as a result of the successor's acquisition of the manufacturer's
business is usually left without recourse.129 Consequently, in developing the product line rule, the Ray court designated the successor
manufacturer as an alternative source of compensation. 130 Secondly,
the policy of spreading the risks of defective products to society at
large can only be accomplished by the corporation that has succeeded
to the manufacture of the product line. The successor, being better
able to assume these risks than the injured victim, can estimate the
likelihood and probable costs of injury. Also, since the successor must
take precautions against the risk of injury from its own defective
products, it would be an inconsequential encumbrance to extend that
procedure to cover the predecessor's defective products. '3 Ray's final
policy justification concerned the fairness of burdening the successor
corporation which benefited from the original manufacturer's product line with the predecessor's products liability claims. Measuring
this policy in terms of fairness, the court placed a reasonable limitation on the scope of this benefit-burden analysis of successor corporation liability. 132
Although laudable in these respects, the product line rule does
carry with it negative ramifications. As posited in the Ramirez concurrence, the resultant economic impact upon the business community, especially upon those purchasers retroactively burdened by the
new rule, "could be disastrous as well as inequitable and unjust.' 33
12" Kadens, supra note 75, at 5. Compounding the lack of judicial success generally experienced by such products liability plaintiffs, e.g., Tucker v. Paxon Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th
Cir. 1981); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977): Leannais v. Cincinnati Inc.,
565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977), most dissolution statutes limit recovery to known pre-dissolution
claims, thereby effectively denying claims which are unascertainable at the time of acquisition.
See Henn & Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution on Products Liability Claims, 56
CORNELL L. REv. 865, 896-907 (1971). New Jersey. however, provides a "good cause" exception
for failure to file a claim within the specified period. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-13(1)(a)-(b)
(West Cum. Supp. 1981). This exception would allow the products liability plaintiff to seek
compensation from the shareholders. Id. (Commissioner's Comment). This may still prove
inadequate, however, since shareholder liability is usually very limited. See Henn & Alexander.
supra, at 909-10 n.222; Jeunger & Schulman, supra note 118, at 42.
130 19 Cal. 3d at 22, 560 P.2d at 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
131 The successor that continues manufacturing the same product line has the same resources
and expertise available to it as the original manufacturer had. It would seem, therefore, that the
additional costs of insuring against pre-sale claims would be a minimal addition to the cost of
production. But see notes 133-38 and accompanying text, discussing the difficulties which some
manufacturers encounter in obtaining products liability insurance.
112See Note, Post-DissolutionProductClaims and the Emerging Rule of Successor Liability.
64 VA. L. REv. 861, 877 (1978).
133 86 N.J. at 360, 431 A.2d at 826 (Schreiber, J., concurring). See Leannais v. Cincinnati,
Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977). See also Comment, ProductsLiability and Successor Corpo-
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Justice Schreiber's contention is a reflection of the crisis experienced
by the insurance industry in providing adequate coverage at tolerable
rates.13 4 Small manufacturers, which comprise ninety per cent of all

manufacturers in the United States, .5 are most affected by this
crisis. 38 The manufacturer that is prohibited from obtaining insur-

37
ance because of exhorbitant prices or ineffective policy coverage
may be deterred from acquiring assets from a manufacturer who

refuses to indemnify or provide escrow accounts." 38 Should the successor corporation purchase the assets without obtaining adequate
insurance, the products liability plaintiff could be faced with an
inadequate source of compensation. Moreover, the seller that cannot
afford to offer any of the above devices as consideration in its negotia-

tions may be forced to sell its assets piecemeal, thereby leaving the
plaintiff with no remedy against either the original manufacturer or
the successor. 39 The majority in Ramirez acknowledged the difficulties of obtaining insurance and negotiating accurate purchase
prices, 40 but failed to recognize that this situation may result in
placing the full economic burden of injury on the plaintiff. As the
Ramirez court noted, in time these difficulties should disappear.' 4' As
the corporate planner becomes more aware of contingent liabilities,
he can pressure the industry for more conducive insurance schemes
that will promote, rather than retard, commercial acquisitions,
thereby affording greater and more consistent compensation for the
42
injured product user.
rations:Protectingthe ProductUser and the Small Manufacturer Through IncreasedAvailability
of Products Liability Insurance, 13 U. CAL. DAVIS
134 See UNITED STATES DEPi.

L. REv. 1000, 1002 (1980).

OF COMMERCE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY,

FINAL REPOrr VI 2-13 (1977) (hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT): Kadens, supra note 75, at
22-25: Comment, supra note 133, at 1024-33. For a general discussion of the insurance schemes
typically available to a manufacturer, see Kadens, supra note 75, at 2.5-32.
' ' Comment, supra note 133, at 1003 (citing 25 ENCYCLOPEDIA ANIERICANA 48 (1976)).
13 These manufacturers, often faced with exorbitant insurance premiums, may elect to forgo
procuring insurance and risk the posssibility of a successful products liability action. See Little,
Product Liability- The Growing UncertaintyAbout Warnings, 12 FORuM 995, 995 n.1 (1977);
Comment, supra note 133, at 1026.
'"
FINAL REPorr, supra note 134, at 2-13; Kadens, supra note 75, at 24 n.72.
"3 An indemnification agreement normally provides for reimbursement from the seller for
losses arising from its defective products. See J. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 365-70 (1975).
An escrow account stipulates that funds will be held by a third party to pay for judgments
against the purchaser. Id. at 382-88. Although these reimbursement schemes may offer an
incentive to the purchaser, they may not be obtainable if the predecessor's insurance coverage
terminates at the date of acquisition. See Comment, supra note 133, at 1022.
"' See Juenger & Schulman, supra note 118, at 57. See also Schwartz, Products Liability and
No Fault Insurance: Can One Live Without the Other, 12 FoRuM 130, 131 (1977).
140 86 N.J. at 354, 431 A.2d at 823.
"I Id. at 354-55, 431 A.2d at 823.
". Id. In a recent decision, Leannais v. Cincinnati Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977), a
federal court refused to adopt Ray's product line rule because of such 'wide-ranging ramifica-
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Ray's first policy justification, which concerned the destruction
of a potential remedy against the original manufacturer, will likely be
the cause of confusion in future applications of the product line standard. The concurring justice in Ramirez emphasized that the central
thesis of the product line rule was "the elimination by the successor of
an effective remedy.' 4 3 A close examination of the majority opinion,
however, belies this premise. Purporting to apply Ray's threefold
justification, the majority significantly diminished the necessity of the
defendant's acquisition resulting in the destruction of plaintiff's potential remedy against the original manufacturer. 4 4 Instead, the majority placed primary importance on the continuity of the original manufacturer's product line. 145 Indeed, as the Nieves holding demonstrated, the court placed little emphasis on the liquidation and dissolution of the predecessor-seller in the determination of liability. 4 6 Bruno
Sherman, the current manufacturer of the product line, was held
accountable even though its predecessor was a viable entity. 4 7 Nar-

ti'ons on society." Id. at 441. The court considered such risks as increased insurance rates and
business emigration. Additionally, affording greater products liability recovery to the victim
without adjusting worker's compensation laws would be unjustified. Id. at 440-41 n.7. The court
determined that they were "ill-equipped . . . to balance equities among future plaintiffs and
defendants." Id. at 441. Instead, the court deferred to the legislative process as the appropriate
channel to resolve the issue of successor corporation liability. Id. In response to the uncertainties
that plague products liability law, legislation has been proposed to promote a uniform system of
recovery which, it is hoped, would alleviate many of the existing insurance problems. Draft
Uniform Liability Law, 44 Fed. Reg. 2996, 2997 (1979). For a comprehensive review of this
proposed legislation, see Comment, supra note 133, at 1026-30. Legislative schemes which
would provide compensation for all injured victims through industry-wide insurance plans,
financed through a general tax fund, have also been proposed. See Schwartz, supra note 141. at
132-33. Also suggested as a viable alternative are systems analogous to statutes compensating
victims of crime. Note, supra note 126, at 375 n.104. Any one of these proposals would provide
limited compensation to the plaintiff in those situations where the manufacturer has dissolved
without a successor. Until a plan is effectuated, however, the courts must continue their efforts
to develop a sound and consistent remedy that will equally resolve the conflicts of both parties.
11386 N.J. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825 (Schreiber, J., concurring). If this analysis had been rigidly
followed, the outcome in Nieves might have been very different. Since Harris did not dissolve
following its sale of assets, it remained a source of compensation for the plaintiff. Thus.
responsibility for the original manufacturer's defective products would have fallen solely on
Harris and not on Bruno Sherman whose purchase did not effectively eliminate a remedy for the
plaintiff. See Kadens, supra note 75, at 20 n.63.
" Perhaps this can best be explained by examining the corporate geneology of the acquisitions. Amsted's acquisition did not result in the elimination of the original manufacturer as a
potential source of compensation. It did, however, result in the dissolution of Bontrager. the
intermediate manufacturer. 86 N.J. at 338 n.2, 431 A.2d at 814 n.2.
15 Id. at 350, 431 A.2d at 820.
146Although there is substantial language concerning the manufacturer's liquidation, neither
Ramirez nor Nieves mentions a liquidation requirement in their respective holdings.
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row construction of this policy justification as a condition precedent

would encourage corporations to limit their liability by requiring
sellers to retain their corporate existence after the acquisition. Thus,
plaintiffs would be forced to look to the seller, who has minimal assets
48
which might be insufficient to satisfy products liability claims.1
Therefore, dissolution of the predecessor manufacturer should be irrelevant in determining successor corporation liability. The goal of
products liability, namely to burden the successor corporation which
benefits from the product line and is better equipped to spread the
costs of injury throughout society, is best served by holding the current
manufacturer responsible regardless of the viability of its predecessor.

Although it seems clear that the court followed this reasoning in the
context of a successor corporation that purchased its assets downstream, the liability of a successor when the original manufacturer is
49
still a viable enterprise is uncertain. 1
Also significant is Nieves' extension of the product line rule to
Harris, the intermediate successor corporation. None of the policy
justifications comprising the new rule mandate the imposition of lia-

bility on an intervening corporation no longer connected with the
product line. The intermediate successor no longer secured any benefit from Sheridan's good will or trade name; therefore, it would be
unfair to subject it to potential liability. Of greater importance is the
intermediate's inability to distribute the victim's losses among the
consumers in its market or to obtain adequate insurance protection. 50 Failing to reconcile these distinctions, the court instead reasoned that the intermediate's acquisition contributed to the destruc-

86 N.J. at 368-70, 431 A.2d at 830-31.
118See, e.g., R. J. Enstrom Corp. v. Interceptor Corp., 555 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1977).
119Cf. Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 965 (1975) (substantiality of predecessor's continued existence ignored in imposing liability
on successor corporation); Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr.
119 (1979) (successor could be liable for predecessor's product liabilities even though plaintiff
had potential remedy against predecessor's estate). But cf. Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., Inc., Fla. -,
394 S.2d 552 (Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (court stated, in dictum, that viability of original
manufacturer could bar recovery against successor); Domaine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76 I11.App.
3d 253, 395 N.E.2d 19 (1979) (court stated, in dictum, that successor would not be subject to
product line rule if predecessor continued to exist). See generally Kadens, supra note 75, at 21;
Note, supra note 124, at 254.
" The court found that an indemnification agreement between Harris and Bruno Sherman
evidenced Harris's ability to protect itself against potential liability. 86 N.J. at 371-72, 431 A.2d
at 831-32. It is unclear what degree of weight was placed on this agreement in the court's final
determination. Rather than jeopardize the plaintiff's recovery by limiting it to one successor, the
court perhaps considered Harris's ability to seek recovery against Bruno Sherman as justification
for exposing him to unassumed liabilities.
'41

346

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:327

tion of any remedy against the original manufacturer. Moreover, its
"prominent role in the overall enterprise of manufacturing" the product line justified the imposition of potential products liability.' 5' Citing Ray as the only precedent in support of its product line standard,
the court misconstrued the California decision. Ray held that the
successor corporation which continued the product line became an
"integral part" of the manufacturing enterprise that should assume
the role of the manufacturer in absorbing the cost of injuries.152 Thus,
the court established a nexus between the two manufacturers which
justified the imposition of unassumed liabilities. This link is premised
upon the actions of the successor corporation in continuing to manufacture its predecessor's product line and not from any fault contingent on the destruction of conceivable remedies as intimated in
Nieves. Ray's "integral role" refers to the function of the continuing
manufacturer as cost-avoider and risk-distributor, both of which are
important objectives of strict liability. The intermediate corporation
that has discontinued manufacturing the product line can assume
neither of these roles. Therefore, the extension of the product line rule
to encompass intermediate successor corporations has little relevance
153
to these objectives of strict liability.
Exposing the intermediate corporation, detached trom the product line, to potential liability surrounds the scope of the new rule in a
margin of uncertainty. Wholesalers, retailers, and distributors are all
"product sellers" who can be strictly liable for defectively manufactured products. 154 It is questionable whether liability should be imposed on the successors of such non-manufacturing entities. Because
the successor to the product seller has no control over the product line
(the focal point of the doctrine), extending the scope of the rule to
include these "successor parties" would be unwarranted.' 5 5 Liability
should be commmensurate with the degree of control over the product
id. at 371, 431 A.2d at 831.
19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
153 See Note, supra note 119, at 1325. In this Note, a rule resembling the product line standard
was suggested as an alternative approach to Cyr and Turner. See notes 37-48 supra and
"5'
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accompanying text. The author confined the scope of the proposed rule to current successor
manufacturers, but recognized that such an approach to successor corporation liability might
result in further frustrating the plaintiff's potential recovery. Note, supra note 119, at 1330-31.
The product line rule, however, is not a panacea for every person injured by a defective product.
The courts must balance the interests of both parties, yet remain within the equitable boundaries
of the rule.
154E.g., Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 600-01, 258 A.2d 697, 704 (1969): RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF Toms § 402A, Comment f (1965). See also D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODuCTS
LIAUrrY IN A NUTSHELL, ch. liA, at 1-4 (1974).
135 Moreover, since retailers and distributors are "usually mere conduits" of defective products, it would be unreasonable to further extend liability to their successors. Note, supra note
119, at 1330-31.
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line. Therefore, it is reasonable to limit imposition of successor liability to current product manufacturers.

It is unlikely that the new rule will be limited to the context of
personal injuries.'15
In Transportation Department v. PSC Resources, Inc.,'157 the Ramirez test was applied to a nuisance action
involving property damage. Relying on the appellate division's anal-

ysis of successor corporation liability in Ramirez, the court held that
the defendant, having purchased all of the predecessor's oil refinery
assets and having continued its waste processing and canning facilities, was a successor corporation and therefore responsible for property damage arising from hazardous substances discharged by its
predecessor. 58 After reviewing decisional law ,59 and applicable state
statutes,' 6 0 the court determined that the policy rationale underlying
strict liability in nuisance was analogous to the benefit-burden analysis of strict products liability in tort.' 6 ' Both are concerned with
imposing the costs of injury on the party who is in the best position to
spread those costs to the public. 62 In addition, imposing the responsibility of cleaning up pollution on the successor that continues the
waste disposal process is consistent with the objectives of successor
corporation products liability. These objectives aim to extend the

1 See Knight v. Hollsthammar, 29 Cal. 3d 46, 623 P.2d 268, 171 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1981)
(court refused to determine whether product line rule to successor corporation liability is
applicable in landlord-tenant context). But cf. Kadens, supra note 76, at 15, in which the author
interprets Ray as militating against an application of the product line rule to any claim other
than a personal injury action.
""
175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1151 (Law Div. 1980).
Ild. at 470, 419 A.2d at 1164. The court distinguished an earlier New Jersey decision that
declined to extend the predecessor's strict liability in a nuisance action. See State v. Exxon Corp.,
151 N.J. Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (Ch. Div. 1977). In Exxon, the defendant did not continue
the oil storage business of its predecessor in title.
" At common law, an enterprise will be held liable for injury resulting from abnormally
dangerous activity or from an activity that creates an unreasonable risk of harm to its surroundings. See City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (Law Div. 1976)Lansco. Inc. v. Environmental Protection Dep't, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (Ch. Div.
1975); Scotch Plains Twp. v. Westfield, 83 N.J. Super. 323, 199 A.2d 673 (Law Div. 1964).
11 Two New Jersey statutes codify this common law rule in respect to pollution of water. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 (Vest Cum. Supp. 1976) (imposes strict liability for discharges of
hazardous substances); Id. § 23:5-28 (West Cum. Supp. 1976) (imposes penalties for discharge of
deleterious substances into state's waters).
'"1 175 N.J. Super. at 466. 419 A.2d at 1161. The court further justified its position by finding
that the successor corporation was the "instrumentality to look to for improvement of the waste
disposal process." Id. (citing Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1154). This reasoning, however, is diminished
when considering that the successor's ability to make future improvements has no effect on the
past deeds of its predecessor. Therefore, as an "incentive" objective of successor corporation
liability, this analysis is unpersuasive.
1'- Id. at 467, 419 A.2d at 1162. See W. Paossrn, HANDBOOK: OF THE LAW OF TonTs § 75, at
494-95 (4th ed. 1971).
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manufacturer's enterprise liability to the corporation that succeeds to
its business.16 3 Ultimately, these principles are concerned with the
health and safety of the public.16 4 Having reviewed the issue of a
successor corporation's potential liability for nuisance on the basis of
products liability standards, this decision synthesizes the concept of
transferability of the predecessor's tort liability, whether it be liability
for personal injury or for property damage.
Even though there is substantial language in both Ramirez and
Nieves concerning the good will and trade name as indicative of an
accrued benefit, the focal point of imputing unassumed products
liability appears to be the transfer of essentially all the manufacturing
assets necessary to the continuation of the product line. Therefore, a
corporation which acquires only the good will, trade name, or partial
assets of a dissolving manufacturer should be unaffected by the prod65
uct line rule. 1

A contrary result was reached in a recent California appellate
court decision. 6 6 In Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver,6 7 the court broadly
construed Ray's product line analysis to define a purchaser of limited
assets, good will, and trade name as a successor to the selling corporation. 168 The fact that the defendant manufactured a different product line was irrelevant in the court's analysis. 6 9 Rather, of para70
mount importance was the "maximum recovery for the victim."'1

163175 N.J. at 467-68, 419 A.2d at 1162-63.
'1
See State v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm., 127 N.J. Super. 251, 260. 317 A.2d
86, 93-94 (App. Div. 1974). In Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76 I11.App. 3d 253, 395 N.E.2d
19 (1979), the court declined to apply the product line standard, noting that a safety objective
was misplaced in the determination of successor corporation liability since a successor cannot he
encouraged to improve a defective product that has already been placed on the market. This
observation is undermined when considering the ability of a successor to notify its predecessor's
product users of safety improvements that it has subsequently discovered. See notes 177-82 infra
and accompanying text.
165Cf. Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 501 F.2d 857 (1980) (defendant who benefitted from predecessor's general goodwill but did not engage in manufacture or sale of product line not responsible
for products liability claims against predecessor); Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76 III. App. 3d
253, 395 N.E.2d 19, 23 (1979) (court stated in dictum that product line doctrine of successor
corporation liability would not apply to transaction in which defendant only purchased partial

assets).

I" Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1979).
16797 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1979).
Id. at 897-900, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 122-24. Along with the good will and trade name. the
defendant purchased tools, machinery and equipment, obtained covenants not to compete and
leased the predecessor's building. Id. at 898, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
169Id. at 900-01, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25. The court noted that "manufacturing activity by
its very nature involves modification of a product line or elimination of an unprofitable item.Id. at 901, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
170 Id.
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The court justified placing the burden of compensating the plaintiff
for his injury on the successor corporation because of its ability to shift
the cost of injuries to its customers.' 71 Without the same resources
and expertise attached to the original manufacturer's product line,
however, it is doubtful that the successor which manufactures a dif72
ferent product will be able to adequately spread those costs.
Attaching liability to the mere purchase of good will and/or trade
name would be an inequitable application of the new rule. 73 The

fundamental purpose of strict liability, namely ensuring that the risks
of injury from defective products are included in the cost of the
product, 74 can only be achieved by focusing successor corporation
liability on the product line; use of trade name or the associated good

will should not be determinative. Courts should examine the nature
and consequences of the acquisition to determine the degree to which
the product line is left intact. Of equal importance in this examination
should be a determination that the purchaser is best able to bear the
burden of injury arising from defective units of the product line.
Typically, the acquisition of a manufacturing operation will reflect a
transfer of control, and the product line will continue to be represented as that of the predecessor.175 In this respect, the test espoused
in Ramirez is correct. Acquisitions that do not contemplate a continuance of the product line, however, should be immune from successor

liability. 176

In Nieves, the court indicated that an alternative ground for
imposing successor corporation liability would be a breach of duty to
warn. 77 The extent of the successor's independent responsibility 7 8 to
"Id. Defendant's ability to join its predecessor as codefendant was intimated by the court,
and may have been of significance in its justification of imputing liability in this particular
context. Id. See Note, supra note 119, at 1331. See note 150 supra and accompanying text for a
discussion of the ramifications of the predecessor's continued existence on the successor corporation.
72 Cf. Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F. 2d 620, 62.5 (8th Cir. 1981) (three times removed
purchaser of limited assets was not able to estimate risk of injury arising from seller's product
when manufactured different product).
"I It has been suggested that the requirement of a transfer of good will and trade name as a
necessary factor to impute successor corporation liability is misplaced because it will encourage
corporations to evade liability by continuing the seller's product line without purchasing its good
will or trade name. See Comment, supra note 124, at 256.
174 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toirrs § 402A, Comment c (1965).
"' See Note, supra note 119, at 1326.
£78 By confining the scope of the new rule to those acquisitions that contemplate a continuation of the product line, it would be ensured that "the product will bear the social and individual
costs of its own defects." Comment, supra note 124, at 257 (emphasis added).
'7" 86 N.J. at 372-73, 431 A.2d at 832-33.
178The successor corporation's duty to warn is independent of the manufacturer's duty to
warn its customers of potentially dangerous products that it has placed on the market. For a
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notify consumers of its predecessor's defective products would be dependent upon its knowledge of existing defects that it has discovered
subsequent to the purchase of assets. 79 A common denominator in
decisions ascribing a duty to warn to the successor corporation has
been the existence of a degree of control over the product line. This
control is usually evidenced by a continuation of business relations
between the successor corporation and the customers of the predecessor. 80 The rationale which imputes a duty to warn on the successor
corporation is analogous to the policy considerations that dictate the
imposition of strict products liability on the successor corporation.''
The successor that benefits from existing customer contracts and good
will, and that represents itself as the same enterprise, should be burdened with the responsibility of notifying the predecessor's customers
of subsequently discovered defects in the predecessor's product. Furthermore, the successor that continues manufacturing the product has
the ability and responsibility to test and improve the product. This
82
implies that it is in the best position to discover pre-existing defects.1
Although strict products liability and duty to warn appear to
have evolved from the same policy considerations, the factors comprising the two theories of recovery are distinguishable. The judicially
created product line doctrine of successor corporation liability imposes
responsibility on the successor for the acts of its predecessor. By contrast, the duty to warn imputed to the successor corporation results
from its own activities in servicing and continuing the manufacture of
the product. 83 Given the present posture of existing case law, mere
succession to the assets of the predecessor does not incur the duty to
84
warn of pre-existing defects.1

discussion of a manufacturer's duty to warn, see Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacyof
Information, 48 TEx. L. REv. 398 (1970).
179 See e.g., Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1980); Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc.,
565 F. 2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1971), Wilson
v. Fare Well Corp., 140 N.J. Super. 476, 356 A.2d 458 (Law Div. 1976).
'18 See Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft Serv., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 176, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1981). See
also Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140
N.J. Super. 476, 356 A.2d 458 (Law. Div. 1976).
181See Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F. 2d 857, 866 (9th Cir. 1980). See generally W. Pnossi,.
supra note 162, at 339.
182See Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1971). A more persuasive
policy consideration emanates from this rationale. The successor corporation which continues to
update and improve the product owes a higher standard of care to the consumer because its
control over the product gives it the power to prevent harm from a pre-existing defect.
183 See Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 1977). Cf. Chadwick v. Air
Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (good samaritan analogy supports finding
that successor corporation did not have duty to warn prior consumers of even known defects).
184 E.g., Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft Serv., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 176, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1981):
Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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The successor corporation's subsequent duty to warn is to be
distinguished from its potential liability for injuries proximately

caused by the predecessor's inadequate warning product design defects. 8 5 In a recent decision the Supreme Court of New Jersey examined the issue of the applicability of strict liability to an inadequate
warning products liability action. 8 In Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc. ,1'7 the supreme court held that "given the importance of user
protection and the need for uniformity and consistency in products
liability cases,"' 188 a manufacturer will be strictly liable for injuries

proximately caused by an inadequate warning of the products' dangers. 8 " Thus, it is evident that under the combined holdings of
Ramirez and Freund a successor corporation should be strictly liable
for its predecessor's failure to place adequate warnings on its products.
The significance of Ramirez and Nieves lies in their notable

extension of the doctrine of strict liability. The Supreme Court of New

Jersey, an influential leader in this area of the law, 190 has extended a
manufacturer's strict products liability to its successor corporation.

The new rule fashioned in Ramirez predicates successor corporation
liability on public policy considerations rather than on the traditional
corporate rules governing intercorporate transactions. At the pinnacle
of this new rule is the successor corporation's potential liability by
virtue of its continuation of the predecessor's product line. The court's
extension of the product line rule in Nieves unfortunately transforms
I The product may be defectively designed by virtue of inadequate warnings accompanying
the product at the time of manufacture. See Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229,
432 A.2d 92.5 (1981); Phillip v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TofrTs § 402A, Comment j (1965).
Ilk Freund v. Cellofiim Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981).
16787 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 92.5 (1981).
Ilk Id. at 240, 432 A.2d at 931.
Il Id. at 24041, 432 A.2d at 931.
"" Since the landmark decision of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960), New Jersey has been a forerunner in the promotion of this developing area of
law. Based largely in part on the seminal California Supreme Court decision in Greenam v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), which
departed from the breach of warranty theory of privity and negligence requirement in the
determination of a manufacturer's liability, New Jersey's courts have consistently removed
barriers to products liabflity plaintiffs by obviating inconsistent rules of law. See, e.g., Freund v.
Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 439 A.2d 925 (1981) (dispensing with negligence charge
in inadequate warning design defect cases); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J.
150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979) ("unreasonably dangerous" element no longer required to be proven in
strict products liability action); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972)
(restricting use of contributory negligence as defense to products liability in context of injured
employee); Santor v. A & N1 Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (extending
strict products liability to economic injury). See generally Note, Strict ProductsLiability in New
Jersey: A Survey, 52 Rtrcms L. REv. 21 (1979), for a co'mprehensive review of the judicial
activism of New Jersey courts in strict products liability law.
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Ramirez from an equitable result-oriented approach to a spurious
search for a deep pocket defendant.' 91 It is hoped that future courts

will temper their analysis by limiting the product line rule of successor
corporation liability to the current manufacturing enterprise.

Lori J. Braender

191A" 'deep pocket' theory of liability, fastening liability on defendants presumably because
they are rich, has understandable popular appeal. . . .But as a general proposition, a defendant's wealth is an unreliable indicator of fault, and should play no part, at least consciously, in
the legal analysis of the problem." Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 618, 607 P.2d
924, 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 149 (1980) (Richardson, J., dissenting). See Jeunger & Schulman,
supra note 118, at 56.

